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Abstract:
Culture is increasingly cited as being in need of change if the UK construction industry 
is to improve its efficiency and productivity.   The paper argues that the concept of 
culture is amenable to radically different treatments and that the research community 
must recognise the consequences of this choice if it is to make a useful contribution to 
bringing about the desired change.   The dominant research paradigm in construction 
management is examined and compared to an alternative approach.   The 
consequences attendant upon the choice between these two are explored with 
reference to four phenomena:  a study of quality in the construction industry;  Japanese 
innovation in management;  Deming’s concept of Total Quality Management;  and the 
situation of the site engineer.   It is concluded that the dominant rationalist paradigm 
tacitly endorses existing attitudes and that if researchers are to have a role in changing 
the culture of the industry, then the culture of research must change also.
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1   INTRODUCTION
The publication of the Latham Report (Latham 1994) has again turned attention on the 
institutions of the construction industry and on the culture that has developed within 
them.   The Report reads very much like an ultimatum.   Given over-capacity and 
foreign competition, attitudes must change, or else!   In this paper we wish to consider 
the role that the community of researchers can play in the change that is asked of the 
industry.   Our argument is that the research community is largely dominated by a set 
of methodological assumptions which we will call the rationalist paradigm.   These 
have the effect of tacitly endorsing those very attitudes that are said to be in need of 
change.   We propose, therefore, that if we are to illuminate what is going on in the 
industry, we are in quite as much need of reviewing our culture, as are the practitioners 
whom we research.    
The rationalist paradigm consists in several methodological assumptions and 
techniques which are largely implicit and unchallenged in conventional construction 
management research.   Chief among these is the attempt to import into management 
research the distinction which is drawn in natural science between subjective 
experience and objective reality.   The use of this analytic device is intended to produce 
a neutral description of some field of human activity.   Such a field is conceived of as a 
natural system.   The aim is to identify  the constituent elements of  the system, show 
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how they interact, and show how the system as a whole interacts with its 
environment.   The attraction of this paradigm, applied at both the individual and 
organisational levels, is that it seems capable of providing specific and scientifically 
valid statements about the probability of human effectiveness and of organisational 
success and failure.   It offers to show how key variables are related and how they can 
be managed to achieve successful outcomes. 
In brief, our contention is that rationalist assumptions and ways of thinking about 
organisation have become institutionalised, deeply embedded within the culture of 
research.   This is not a novel view,  and much of the conventional wisdom referred to 
above has long been challenged by a vigorous, if minority, tradition within the fields of 
sociology, social psychology, philosophy and anthropology.   In addition, a new wave 
of writers on organisation and management is renewing the attack on rationalism, in 
favour of an interpretativist approach (Morgan1992, Checkland and Scholes1990, 
Senge et al 1994, Hamel and Prahalad1994).    
Our argument is set out as follows.   First, we will explore, in turn, the consequences 
for research of the rationalist and interpretativist paradigms.   Having set out the 
choice before us, we will examine its consequences, with reference to four examples. 
First, we will comment upon a research project in which one of us was involved, 
demonstrating the limitations of the conventional methodology and showing how these 
can be overcome.   We then look at the revolution in Japanese manufacturing 
promoted by Ohno, highlighting the parallels between Ohno’s devolution of 
responsibility to operatives and our own ‘bottom-up’ research perspective.   Thirdly, 
we consider the career of Deming, showing how his innovative approach to quality fell 
foul of the rationalist paradigm.   Finally, we will provide an example of the kind of 
view which an interpretative approach provides, by making some observations upon 
the situation of site engineers.
This paper is somewhat unconventional, in construction management discourse.   It is 
not a technical report, offering to further extend knowledge of the industry, nor is it 
even an attempt to outline a particular methodology.   Rather, it is an attempt to bring 
into question some fundamental assumptions, which are accepted among the research 
community.   What we are asking of our readers is not an easy thing, it is to re-
examine some beliefs which are so fundamental to the practice of management 
research in this industry, that they are rarely even made explicit, let alone made subject 
to criticism.   The difficulties of such a task have been often noted.   Hamel and 
Prahalad, for example, write of  deeply ingrained habits of thought among managers, 
which they refer to as ‘managerial frames.’   Viewing the world through such frames, 
managers routinely exclude alternative ways of seeing a problem.   Furthermore, 
“Managerial frames become part of the organisational fabric as they are enacted 
through the firm’s administrative structure and processes.” (op cit p50).   In this way, 
managers can blind themselves to future possibilities.   Hamel and Prahalad conclude 
that managers need to unlearn much of their conventional wisdom and note that this is 
far more difficult than learning because, for most of the time, we are not aware of what 
we have learnt. We just act on it.
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2.  THE DOMINANT RATIONALIST PARADIGM.
We have observed that the chief assumption of the rationalist paradigm is the 
distinction which is drawn between subjective experience and objective reality.   Within 
natural science, this distinction appears as unproblematic.   This is because the 
concepts which natural scientists use are ‘first order constructs’ (Schutz1971).   They 
constitute the imposition of meaning upon a natural order which, in itself, is meaning 
free.   To put the matter simply, if we attribute the fall of an apple to the force of 
gravity, then neither the apple, nor gravity have a voice with which to contradict us. 
The situation of social researchers is altogether different.   They comes upon a world in 
which meaning is already made.   Thus, their concepts must either reflect or rival those 
that they find - and if the latter, then by what authority can researchers claim the 
superiority of their own version of events? 
This question is usually answered in terms of the second fundamental assumption, that 
the correct way to describe and analyse situations is through the employment of causal 
explanation.   If  ‘variables’ can be isolated and correlations established, then causal 
implications can be drawn.   These formulations can then be tested through the 
application of the experimental method.   We will be arguing in the next section, that 
such an approach is inimicable to the special demands of social research.    
Thirdly, simplified models of reality are created out of these putative causal relations. 
These purport, to show what functions each of the elements perform relative to the 
others, and how they are co-ordinated to achieve specific objectives in the environment 
in which they occur.   Thus, it is assumed possible to describe patterns of contingent 
relationships that hold between the variables that contribute to organisational survival 
or extinction.   Organisational activity is conceived of in terms of systems, a standard 
distinction being between the ‘technical’ and the ‘social’ or ‘human’.
Consistent with the aim of the rationalist paradigm - to abstract and model fields of 
social action as natural systems - two sets of concerns, commonly referred to as the 
‘technical’ and ‘contractual’ systems have received considerable attention.   Since the 
approach makes an essential separation between technical system and human system, 
the intention is to perfect the (abstract) technical system and then fit the human system 
to it.   This is the equivalent of separating “the dancers from the dance,” as Scarbrough 
and Corbett (1992) put it.   Despite choreographers, dances cannot exist without 
dancers.   As we will attempt to demonstrate, this abstraction leads to confusion and 
impotence in the recommendations of researchers. 
The assumption is that if the system designer works hard enough he can and should 
aim to make it ‘idiot-proof.’   Thus, the search for ‘efficient’ checking techniques and 
tools is an important part of the agenda (for example, Parsons1972; Chase and 
Federle1992).   This approach is nicely summarised by Welfare (1987):
“The road to perfection is by investigating the mystique which surrounds the 
physical placing of concrete and reducing it to a measurable, disciplined and 
easily repetitive activity.” (op cit pp32-3)
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As will become apparent, in our discussions of Deming and Ohno, below, this 
emphasis runs counter to much management thinking, especially as it concerns the 
management of quality.  
On the technical front, the problem is defined as the need to articulate in exact and 
comprehensive detail the intrinsic technical logic of the construction process.   The 
attempt is to construct a blueprint of how the process can be made to work most 
efficiently.   The blueprint provides management with a control tool in two senses.   It 
is intended to provide a detailed description of exactly what goes where, when and 
how, against which implementation can be checked and the necessary remedial action 
taken.   In the more ambitious versions of this approach, the intention is so perfectly to 
hone the tool that nothing can go wrong.   Secondly, as a consequence of its supposed 
performance of the first function, it acts as a device to legitimate management control. 
Offered as the pure expression of instrumental rationality it brooks no objection.    
Proponents do make concessions concerning the completeness of the system that they 
can construct and the necessity of accommodating the technical system to the social or 
human systems.   Nonetheless, many commentators in construction management 
research seem to hold this view in its extreme form, what we may call the ‘Engineering 
Fix’.   It holds that, given the vagaries of human nature and the uncertainties of human 
conduct, it is possible, in principle, to understand and describe the inherent 
characteristics of the technical system.   With increasingly sophisticated tools to help, it 
becomes possible to get at least that right.   
If concern on the technical front is to devise a system describing what should happen, 
on the contractual front, the concern is with how relationships can be controlled so 
that what should happen does happen.   As is frequently noted, the contract assumes 
special significance in construction.   This is due to the cost, complexity, novelty and 
uncertainty of many projects and, therefore, to the necessary involvement of several 
different parties experiencing different levels of risk.   A central issue becomes; how 
should rights and responsibilities be allocated. 
It is significant that the point of reference or model for considering the nature of these 
conventions is often the idealised, unitary organisation with a centralised source of 
authority and control, more or less completely responsible for designing and 
manufacturing a product.   In other words, the model is that of the legal-rational 
organisation or bureaucracy, classically described by Weber and which he saw as a 
shrine to the ascendancy of Western forms of  cause and effect reasoning. 
Thus, some participants in the perennial debate that goes on about the distribution of 
contractual rights that will best promote quality argue that it should be the contractor 
who is in control, i.e. should be at the top of the, in fact,  non-existent hierarchy 
(Lombard1975, Breakwell1985). Others say it should be the design professionals 
(Issak1982); and yet others, the client (Bubshait and Al-Musaid1992). It is evident that 
every analysis of the shortcomings of the industry from Banwell  to Sir Michael 
Latham himself, looks to new forms of procurement contract  for a solution 
(Banwell1964, Latham1994). 
Our concern here is that research on contracts can easily become dominated by the 
rationalist diagnosis, which dwells exclusively on tools of control.   Its attention to the 
formal provisions of contract tend to ignore all the taken-for-granted conventions of 
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everyday life which make any contract possible (Durkheim1933).   As is frequently 
observed on construction projects, a good project is one where the formal provisions 
stay on a shelf gathering dust.   Meaning is exchanged and shared without recourse to 
them.
The rationalists takes for granted the interpretative frameworks that are used to 
organise and communicate perception, thus effectively ignoring them.   Instead of 
investigating the interpretations of others, they simply assert one of their own.   Where 
the rationalist perspective is asserted by practitioners, supported by the researchers 
who have articulated it for them, it obstructs understanding of what is actually going 
on in the relationships between people.   From the point of view of those trying to 
bring about change, possible futures are foreclosed.   It is not surprising, then, that 
many of the practitioners we interview, express cynicism about management theory 
and our role as researchers.      
It is important to appreciate that this explanatory framework is a constituent of the 
current situation and not simply a description of it.   It is a feature of the industry’s 
culture.   The kinds of answers it generates to the question, ‘why does this practice 
persist?’ are, ‘because of incomplete control systems; inadequate supervision; weak 
management’ (technical); or ‘contracts do not adequately specify requirements and 
obligations and are not adequately enforced’ (contractual).   Thus, the answers are 
prescriptive and the remedies prescribed are tighter more elaborate regulatory systems.
From this paradigm has issued most of the conventional wisdom on the design and 
management of organisation; it offers specific items of advice as to what managers can 
actually do. (How that advice is supposed to be taken, how it is to be interpreted in 
particular contexts is another matter.) The impact of the paradigm has been important 
in two ways.
Firstly, it has legitimated the control of some people over others.   The point is taken 
up later in the paper but, for the moment, it is sufficient to say that the rationalist 
paradigm may provide a justification for a chosen course of action.   It enables a 
manager, for example, to say:  “I have considered the relevant variables which are 
related in the ways that research has established. I am simply enacting demonstrated 
principles. Science is neutral.” 
Secondly, as Morgan (1986) has pointed out, the paradigm has provided a language 
for conceiving of and talking about organisation.   Researchers and managers have 
become accustomed to using such terms as ‘structure,’ ‘culture,’ ‘motivation’ and so 
on. These terms have entered the everyday experience of practitioners and are used to 
organise and communicate that  experience.   They serve a purpose and, insofar as they 
are used, one may assume that they  are considered adequate.   In contrast, given the 
more stringent requirements of reporting research,  the way they are used within the 
rationalist paradigm is a matter of some confusion and will be considered below.
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3.  AN  ALTERNATIVE:  THE INTERPRETATIVE PERSPECTIVE
One strand of the interpretative tradition originates in the work of Weber and his 
conception of verstehende.   This German word translates into English as 
‘understanding.’   It refers, however, to the understanding of another’s point of view, 
rather than the kind of causal understanding which is the aim of the rationalist 
approach.   It amounts to a recognition that to fully understand people’s attitudes and 
beliefs, is to understand how they perceive the world (Weber1933).   To attempt to 
build attitudes and beliefs into causal theories about people’s behaviour, to create 
simplified models of that behaviour, to judge it from a putatively objective point of 
view, is to distort reality.   It is to depart from the ‘insider’s view,’ which the verstehen 
method seeks to achieve.   A great deal of  Weber’s work was an attempt to relate this 
verstehen understanding to the kind of conventional model building we have discussed. 
As will become clear, we feel that he failed in this attempt.   
A second strand to the tradition originates with the work of the American social 
psychologist, G.H.Mead and continued through the work of the Chicago School of 
Sociology.   Even more than Weber, Mead places interaction between individuals at 
the centre of his analysis.    Society is seen through the eyes of the people who live it. 
The valuable body of work which was produced directly by, or under the influence of, 
the Chicago sociologists, is too vast to review here.   We will restrict ourselves to the 
consideration of one paper, Blumer’s (1967) cogent critique of variable analysis in 
social science.
Blumer argues that variable analysis, such as that attempted in the study we consider 
below, is inadequate for the understanding of social processes.   The kind of findings 
that are produced in the study of social situations are of a local nature, they have no 
general validity.   In order to understand such findings, it is necessary to understand 
the context in which they are produced.   Preparing data for statistical analysis, 
however, involves isolating variables and abstracting them from the context in which 
they are produced.   This involves two major drawbacks.   First, it overlooks the fact 
that a process of interpretation intervenes between the independent and dependent 
variables.   As Blumer observes,
“Interpretation is a formative or creative process in its own right.   It constructs 
meanings which ... are not predetermined or determined by the independent 
variable.” (op cit p.87)
Secondly, the need for clear-cut, unitary definitions of variables leads to an 
oversimplification of complex phenomena.   We shall be exploring  the  consequences 
of this latter point in the four examples that follow.
 
Since the 1960’s, the interpretative perspective has been greatly enhanced by the study 
of ethnomethodology initiated by Garfinkle (1967).   By studying the ordinary, 
everyday methods used by members of society to discover, establish and communicate 
the facts of social life, Garfinkle initiated a further radicalisation of social research. 
Abandoning any attempt to utilise scientific methods of research or theory building, he 
concentrates instead on the study and utilisation of these ‘member’s methods.’   It is 
these methods which, along with Garfinkle, we see as the only viable ones for social 
research.   They are techniques in which every member of society is experienced and 
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competent.   It is the researchers’ task to develop their own proficiency in using these 
methods and to continually increase the rigour with which they are applied.   There is 
no space here to enter into an exploration of the consequences of this belief.   For a 
penetrating study of members methods, see Garfinkle (op cit), especially Chapter Five. 
For a fuller account of an interpretativist approach to construction management 
research, see Rooke and Seymour (forthcoming).    
Although Ethnomethodology is a programme for empirical research and not a critical 
perspective, many of the insights it has achieved serve to undermine the rationalist 
paradigm.   For example, Zimmerman’s (1971) study, highlights the fact that members 
of an organisation use the organisation’s rules in a selective manner.   Judgements are 
made on an ad hoc, day to day basis, which are intended to maintain the smooth 
running of the organisation and get through the work in hand.   As Bittner observes:   
“formal organisational designs are schemes of interpretation that competent 
and entitled users can invoke in yet unknown ways whenever it suits their 
purposes.   The varieties of ways in which the scheme can be invoked for 
information, direction, justification and so on, without incurring the risk of 
sanction, constitutes the scheme’s methodical use.” (Bittner1973,p272)     
 
Similar developments have taken place in the fields of anthropology and philosophy. 
Early European anthropologists saw the peoples that they began to study in the 19th 
century as having primitive or undeveloped versions of their own cultures.   Cultures 
that featured magic and rituals were expected to evolve in the same way as their own. 
The rational, scientific demonstration of cause and effect would replace magic and 
ritual.
However, as a result of ethnographic techniques which involved living amongst these 
people, it became clear that they were not victims of delusion.   In the conduct of their 
everyday lives they were patently practical people who understood and used cause and 
effect  in a way consistent with the rational explanations held by the anthropologists 
themselves.   Ritual and magic was then seen as being functional at the affective level. 
In the famous case of the Trobriand Island fishermen, for example, since they made 
sure that their boats were seaworthy and that their nets were sound, they were seen to 
have a clear causal understanding of the consequences of these measures.   The 
ceremonies which the fishermen undertook before going to sea, rather than being 
intended to have a direct causal effect on ensuring calm weather, performed the 
function of reassuring them and strengthening their sense of group identity. 
More recently, philosophers and anthropologists have developed this point still further. 
In his seminal critique of  both traditional anthropology and of Evans-Pritchard’s more 
enlightened view, the Wittgenstinian philosopher Winch (1964) proposed that the 
practical (in western terms) and the ceremonial or affective are all of a piece and it is to 
think unsystematically if one imposes a partial and selective explanatory framework. 
There is no objective, value free point of view, argues Winch, from which the 
rationality of a culture may be judged.   On the contrary, non-scientific ways of 
thinking, such as bodies of religious or magical belief, have their own rationale, by 
which truth or falsity of an assertion may be judged.   Thus, we may say that the true 
naiveté lies with the rationalist researcher, who presumes to select from a complex, 
integrated culture only that which he understands and to see the rest as mumbo-jumbo. 
While it is perfectly appropriate, in the context of the rationalist paradigm, to look for 
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strictly causal relationships, it must be recognised when such analysis addresses only 
part of the problem.   Moreover, while we in the West pride ourselves on being able to 
distinguish cause and effect, we too ritualise ways of dealing with events and make 
sense of them in non-causal ways.   Some examples of this are provided below, in the 
exploration of the situation of the site engineer.
To summarise, the interpretative paradigm takes the points of view of individual 
practitioners as the focus of research.   It recognises that the standpoint and values of 
researchers have no logical priority and that these easily become the occasion for bias 
and special pleading.   It further recognises that this partiality on the part of the 
researcher cannot entirely be remedied, but must be kept continually in view;  for the 
capacity to understand the values and beliefs of others is contingent upon being a 
social being with values and beliefs of one’s own (Weber1966).   Nevertheless, a 
deeper understanding of others is possible, given sufficient time and patience.   Given 
knowledge of the beliefs and purposes of those whose activities we research, an 
accurate and useful account of them is possible.
The interpretative paradigm generates several kinds of answers to the question, ‘why 
does this or that practice exist?’   The values of those who perform these practices, 
their conscious reasons for maintaining them, are made clear.   Their reactions to 
attempts to change these practices and values may be explored.   Their own views on 
how improvements might be made can be elicited.   Views about the practices of 
others might also be sought.   Thus, the answers are descriptive rather than 
prescriptive, the description providing a sound empirical basis from which prescription 
can then be made.
4.  THE RATIONALIST PARADIGM AS AN OBSTACLE TO EFFECTIVE 
RESEARCH.  
The study with which we will be concerned examined specific structural features taken 
from a sample of twenty-five projects.   It was designed to establish:  i) the quality of 
the finished construction, defined as the extent to which it conformed to the 
specifications provided in the design;  ii) what organisational features, work practices, 
and the like, correlated with these outcomes.   It is not our purpose here to report the 
results of the study, some of which have been published in Shammas-Toma et al 
(1994) where a fuller account of the study is given.   We merely wish to highlight some 
methodological issues, for the purpose of discussion.
The projects varied in type of structure, size, and contract used and were located 
throughout the UK.   The research was carried out by a team of engineers and a social 
scientist.   A sample of structural elements on each site was monitored throughout the 
construction process.   The completed structural elements were subjected to a series of 
tests and measurements.   Photographs were taken of work in progress by the 
fieldworker.   Informal interviews were conducted with operatives, foremen, engineers 
and managers during the course of the work, about what they were doing, why they 
were doing it and so on.   The period of investigation for each site was, on average, 
one month.   
On the basis of the evidence established through the monitoring process, defects and 
the reasons for them were identified.   Sites were allotted scores for quality achieved 
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(incidence of defects) and causal explanations of the defects were established. 
Defects were distinguished into two classes depending on  their origins.   Within the 
first class, referred to as 'management-controllable defects,’ were placed those defects 
that were judged to have originated in:
1   Impractical design, such as a clash in the position of components;
2   Components  having been despatched to site by suppliers wrongly dimensioned or 
out of tolerance;
3   Inappropriate methods of construction adopted by contractors or the supply of 
inappropriate materials.
A second class was 'operative-controllable defects', judged to result directly from 
operative action,  such as misplacement or omission of components.   In other words, 
defects were classified as those which appear during construction but originate before 
it (management-controllable) and those which occur during it (operative-controllable). 
The categorisation of defects into the four types of cause, was carried out by an expert 
panel comprising four structural or civil engineers.
The panel’s task was to reconstruct what had happened, using the field researcher’s 
measurements, observations and reported discussions with participants.   This 
procedure, we suggest, has two fundamental weaknesses.   First, while they may have 
been able, on matters of technical or engineering judgement, to accomplish this 
without too much distortion, to establish the sequence of decisions and events that had 
led to the technical defects and causes presented a different order of problem. 
Reconstructing what had happened took the panel far beyond purely engineering 
considerations into the realms of organisational practice, contractual liability, human 
motive and so on.   They had no explicit methodology for dealing with these issues.
For example, a typical event needing to be evaluated was the construction of a 
reinforced concrete lift shaft on a building project. The reinforcement box was 
constructed with the appropriate placement of spacers. The form fixers (who provided 
the plywood for the forms) had difficulty fixing the form because the box was slightly 
over size.   Was this the designers’ fault, or the suppliers?   Should the contractors be 
blamed for not checking?   In the process of making the box fit, the form fixers 
knocked off most of the spacers.   As a result, the finished construction did not meet 
the specifications.  Again, should this be attributed to poor workmanship, to ignorance, 
or to carelessness on the part of the operatives?   There was no apparent consultation 
between or attempt to co-ordinate the steel fixers and form fixers.   The researcher 
also observed that although the site agent saw the event which led directly to the 
defect, no corrective action was taken.   
Resolving these issues calls for judgements of right or wrong.   The rationalist 
paradigm, derived as it is from the methodology of rational science, is concerned 
primarily with judgements of is or is not.   It makes no explicit provision for answering 
questions with an ethical or political dimension.   Such necessary judgements are not 
provided for within the rationalist paradigm.  This raises awkward questions.   What 
significance can be attached to the conclusions that the panel was able to arrive at? 
What kind of basis can be established for the kind of judgements at which they arrived?
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Secondly, even the technical decisions made by the panel were made in the abstract, 
with no real involvement in the situation, and no real consequences attending them. 
The technical decisions made on site are made by people very much aware of possible 
consequences, especially contractual and financial ones.    It was found later through 
interviews with site staff that achieving the specifications with regard to the particular 
feature under investigation was not seen as a priority.  Greater priority was given to 
finishing the job in as short a time as possible.   This was attributed to the fact that site 
staff were under pressure from head office and that, anyway, they did not have enough 
engineers.   Further, it was found that steel fixers were employed on an individual basis 
as labour-only and that far from there being consultation between them and the form 
fixers, there was no possibility of it.   By the time the latter started work, the steel 
fixers had left for another site.   Finally, it was alleged that even if it had been the right 
size it was a ‘damned stupid’ design which would have been difficult or impossible to 
comply with anyway.   
Even insofar as the panel was able to empathise, they were faced with the problem that 
the meaning of the data is dependent upon the context in which it is produced.   Since 
the methodology involved forced the panel to work with data which was 
decontextualised, their grasp of the problems involved was necessarily vague.   In 
order to compensate for this, they had imaginatively to reconstruct the situations by 
drawing on their own experience.    Imaginative construction and reconstruction of 
events is a necessary part of the documentary method.   However, the whole texture of 
informal arrangements and tacit agreements that characterise a workplace and 
particularly a construction project were largely unknown to the field researcher and 
entirely unknown to the panel.   Viable assessments of these matters can be made only 
with the situated knowledge of  those actively engaged, or alternatively, by the 
committed ethnographic researcher, who has taken considerable time to get to know 
the participants and their situation.     
It will come as no surprise that the  accounts, explanations and rationalisations offered 
by different individuals varied widely.   People blame each other:  accusations are made 
about incompetence, laziness, dishonesty and so on.   While it was possible at times to 
verify the factual accuracy of what a respondent claimed had occurred, why it had 
occurred and whose responsibility it was supposed to be, for much else of the time, 
there was no way in which the accuracy or truth of a given account could reliably be 
established.   In such circumstances, the only safeguard against bias is the rigorous 
application of verstehen.   There is no single, objective or neutral account to be had.
10
5.   THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM:  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE.
At this point in the research, one of us was introduced to Womack et al’s 'The 
Machine that Changed the World'. In particular, he was struck by the book’s 
description of Ohno’s insight regarding the consequences of engineering-dominated, 
mass-production thinking. This thinking results in a  production system where no 
reference is made to those who operate it apart from how they have to be controlled in 
order to fit it.
The book (Womack et al,1990) is primarily a study of the changes that the Japanese 
brought to automobile production.   One of the key figures in these changes was 
Taiichi Ohno who saw the inefficiencies built into the mass production system.   For 
example, the system as a whole could only be overseen from a synoptic point of view. 
Furthermore, it was assumed that if the workers were allowed to stop the line, they 
might do so for various personal and nefarious reasons.   Ohno recognised how 
disastrously inefficient this was, with errors piling upon errors till the system boundary 
was reached.   He introduced a facility for stopping the line at each work station so 
that problems could be remedied as they occurred.   He went further.   Womack et al  
write:
“In mass production plants, problems tended to be treated as random events. 
The idea was simply to repair each error and hope that it didn’t recur.   Ohno 
instead instituted a system of problem-solving called “the five why’s.” 
Production workers were taught to trace systematically every error back to its 
ultimate cause (by asking “why” as each layer of the problem was uncovered), 
then to devise a fix, so that it would never occur again.” (op cit p.57)
There is a clear parallel here to the research problem described above.   No engineer or 
panel of engineers was able to properly adjudicate on why defects occurred;  it 
required the situated knowledge of those on the spot.   The research procedure was the 
product of a particular mode of thinking whose negative consequences Ohno had 
astutely noticed.   It was perfectly respectable within the rationalist paradigm.   So long 
as due care is taken according to its conventions, the researcher is expected to 
establish the facts of what happened.   That is what research is supposed to provide 
and, to an extent, it does so.   However, the procedure was severely limited in its 
scope, since it could not address the reality of the data, which far from constituting a 
single, describable course of events, consisted of a variety of partially conflicting 
versions.   From a methodological point of view, how these different versions are 
managed, negotiated, resolved, and so on, is the stuff of culture and should be the 
object of our attention.   From a practical point of view, the rationalist perspective 
directs attention away from a conclusion like Ohno’s, which points to the need to 
authorise operatives to diagnose and act on their diagnosis.   The alternative, not 
adopted by Ohno, is a putatively objective viewpoint, offered, in fact, from an 
engineering perspective and one which would have marginalised alternatives.
Whilst not wishing to make too much of the Japanese initiatives in re-engineering,  we 
see within them an implicit recognition of the limitations of the rationalist paradigm, its 
abstractness and partiality, when used in the attempt to understand and explain 
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complex human processes.   To accomplish this, it is necessary, to employ a 
methodology that addresses the totality. 
In considering Ohno’s innovation, care must be taken in interpreting what it means and 
what inferences for practice can be made.   We believe the following inferences can be 
made.   Firstly, someone who is not a member of an organisational setting risks not 
understanding what is going on and thus imposing an irrelevant or inaccurate 
interpretation of it.   Secondly, although a work process was radically re-engineered, in 
a particular setting, we need to know much more about that setting before making 
generalisations about practice.   In particular, what was it about that setting which 
enabled the adoption of the change?   Thus, we need to know much more about the 
circumstances of change.   For example, was the pursuit of causes in the ‘Five Why’s’ 
so firmly directed at the technical, as is implied, or were there instances of buck-
passing, covering of backs, denials of alleged causes and so on, such as were present in 
the cases our research considered?   If so, how were they adjudicated?   Given the 
probability that many answers are provided in the mass of research carried out by the 
Womack team and point, say, to a highly cohesive corporate culture (Dore1973) 
where there is great incentive to look only for technical causes or where finger-
pointing is untainted by the suspicion of personal or political motive, there remains the 
problem of the genesis of such a culture.   To what extent could it arise in the context 
of different traditions, expectations about work, democracy, and individual freedom 
(White and Trevor1983)?    It is reported, for example, that there is a less acceptable 
face to Japanese industry, where dissent is met with intimidation, and an appearance of 
harmony masks resentment and jealousy of fellow workers (Junkerman1982).
We will illustrate the importance of this second point with reference to the career of 
W.E. Deming
6.   DEMING AND THE  LIMITATIONS OF THE RATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE
Deming’s career can be seen as a struggle to come to terms with the issues referred to 
above concerning susceptibility of national cultures to change and so provides a highly 
significant comment on them.   Deming is frequently cited as the proverbial prophet in 
his own country.    A lukewarm response to his ideas at home in the US contrasted 
with a warm reception in Japan.   Then, due to the reputation his success had brought, 
Americans too clamoured to adopt them.   This enthusiasm waned, however, as the 
radical nature of his approach became apparent.   He is now widely recognised as an 
originator of the concept of TQM and a key figure in the remarkable post war 
industrial success of Japan.   How far the full extent of his message will register only 
time will tell.
As a statistician, his abiding and central idea was that the key to quality is to control 
variation in the production process, and so to reduce variation in the finished product. 
This statistical approach to quality lies firmly within the rationalist paradigm. 
However, the task of controlling the variation, which the use of statistics makes it 
possible to identify, opened up a view of organisation, its relationships with customers 
and suppliers and the role of management, with quite revolutionary implications.   The 
concern with the systemic causes of variation shifted the emphasis from the structure 
of organisations to the processes that they were intended to perform.   This involved 
asking radical and often unpalatable questions about the efficacy of existing structures 
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and the values and expectations of the people, their attitudes (especially those of 
managers) and the need to change them.   The famous fourteen points are an attempt 
to articulate this realisation;  to state the key principles for a philosophy of change. 
Though statistics and the other products of the rationalist paradigm provide the tools 
for this revolution, their potential can only be realised to the extent that the 
organisational expressions of the paradigm are overturned. 
The relative failure of Western companies to adopt Deming’s ideas has been attributed 
to the power of vested interests.   This diagnosis is consistent with what we have 
suggested - people who have power, authority and status within existing structures are 
not anxious for them to be shaken.   However, we are drawing attention to the more 
subtle and deep rooted reason for resistance to change:  the very ways we think about, 
investigate and understand organisation forecloses certain conclusions about them and 
veils the possibilities of what they might become.
Looked at from the perspective of the rationalists, Deming’s fourteen points seem like 
a series of contradictions and indeed he has been criticised precisely for not providing 
clear-cut programmes for how his ideas are to be realised (Flood1993)   Such 
criticisms, demand the impossible.   Deming’s (1986) fundamental propositions are not 
intended as a set of rational cause-effect procedures or algorithms; they do not offer a 
clear set of instructions.   On the contrary, they contain paradoxes.   From the rigid 
logic of the control loop, where objectives are clearly stated, methods monitored and 
shortfalls remedied, this is anathema.   Constancy of purpose and a philosophy of 
change, for instance, are difficult to reconcile.   Yet, both are integral to the first of 
Deming’s 14 points:  
“Create constancy of purpose toward improvement of product and service, 
with the aim to become competitive and to stay in business, and to provide 
jobs.”   (op cit p23)   
For Deming, the intention to innovate should itself be a constant purpose. 
Furthermore, constancy of purpose (to stay in business) will provide the secure 
atmosphere in which innovation can flourish.   These terms, then, do not  identify 
measurable variables, which are causally related.   The logical relations between them 
are of a different nature.  
The questions that Deming’s work raises are numerous.   For instance, point twelve 
recommends the removal of  barriers to “pride of workmanship.”   On the other hand, 
point five calls upon companies to,
“ Improve constantly and forever the system of production and service, to improve 
quality and productivity, and thus constantly decrease costs.” (ibid)
Is pride in workmanship consistent with the collective pressures of continually refining 
procedures?   It is a much noted aspect of innovation that old skills become redundant. 
To what extent can the two prescriptions be reconciled?   Which should take 
precedence when they cannot?   These are questions which can only be answered in 
particular contexts in particular firms. 
Furthermore, the answers must be measured against the injunction to 
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“Drive out fear, so that everyone may work effectively for the company.” 
(ibid)
Again, point thirteen calls for “education and self improvement.” (p24)   But is 
education merely to mean indoctrination, as sometimes appears to be the case in the 
work  of Peters and Waterman (1982), for instance.   If it is not, of what does it 
consist and for what purpose?   Clearly, there are value judgements to be made.   
Deming’s increasing attention to the fact of organisation as a human process, replete 
with conflict and contradiction and, in all this, the centrality of meaning and ways of 
thinking, were simply too difficult to reconcile with rationalistic Western conceptions 
of organisation and management’s role in it.   He was forced to address the multiple, 
perceived realities that constitute organisations and the intrinsic contradictions that this 
view reveals.   His advice is in terms of paradoxes because that is all it sensibly can be. 
His later American experience caused him to widen his perception, something he had 
not been required to do in the atmosphere of receptivity he found in Japan.   He was 
forced to look beyond the more operational aspects of his work and consider exactly 
what it was about the Japanese situation that had led to this receptivity.   How far 
Deming was himself constitutionally capable of pursuing the research agenda - the 
totality of Japanese culture, to which his experience pointed, it is not necessary to 
speculate. 
What we insist upon is that it is this same challenge which confronts the community of 
construction management researchers today.   Charged with the task of reporting upon 
the very culture from which it originates and armed with methods developed for a very 
different purpose, it faces an impasse.   Previous training leads researchers and 
sponsors alike to believe that research can and should produce a body of objective 
facts.   The nature of social process is resistant to such an endeavour.   Inasmuch as 
such facts are produced, they represent a distortion of the true picture, necessarily 
constituting a partial account.   This distortion has a double effect, as well as 
preventing insights into the nature of the management problems it seeks to address, it 
acts to reinforce existing attitudes.   Thus, instead of facilitating the change for which 
Latham, for example, has called, it acts as a profoundly conservative force.   Breaking 
out of this circle will not be easy.   In order, even to question the existing culture, it is 
necessary to escape the restraining bonds of allegiance, interest, and habit of mind. 
Unless culture is treated in the terms that it requires rather than in the terms of the 
rationalist paradigm, culture will be projected as an entity that can be managed and 
controlled just as it was once believed that organisations could be controlled, like 
rationally designed machines.   Deming was faced with the fact that a culture is a way 
of interpreting  and constructing a social reality.   Statistical tools, which lay at the 
core of his approach, neutral as they seem in themselves, take on different meanings 
depending on the culture and context in which they are put to use; who uses them, for 
what purposes, their assumed limitations, the inferences that may be made from them 
and so on.   Similarly, in diagnosing what is currently happening in the UK 
construction industry, we must take great care about the ways in which the tools of the 
diagnostic process, themselves an expression of that culture, imply the remedies which 
the culture already has to hand.   Breaking the mould is difficult and there are already 
ample signs that, in responding to the challenge of national cultures which seem to 
avoid the problems of our own, the preferred conclusion is that culture must be 
managed and controlled.   This rationalistic view of what culture is, presages a 
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conceptual and practical error as great as the belief that organisations themselves 
can be controlled like rationally designed machines.
7.  AN INTERPRETATIVIST VIEW OF THE ENGINEER.
We have stated that, in the interpretative approach, the researcher’s aim is to report 
the perspectives of the participants in particular settings.   The concern is with how and 
why they do things as they do.   The aim is not to report any single truth.   Rather, it is 
recognised that any particular report or account of how and why things happen is 
produced for particular purposes, audiences and circumstances and is tailored 
accordingly.   This assumption holds as much for the accounts of a researcher as the 
people s/he is researching.   The accounts that the researcher offers are intended to 
reveal how people construct their world, what meaning they attach to things and 
events.   S/he is concerned with what people think they are doing, not what they may 
be said to be doing from any, claimed neutral standpoint (Vaill1975).   From within the 
interpretative paradigm, what people think they are doing is seen as the very crux of 
what is meant by culture.   Culture is, first and foremost, a method used by people with 
reference to other people (Eglin1980).   It is not to be treated as some objective 
totality or system 'out there.’
With respect to the research material presented above, regarding the achievement of 
structural quality, the interpretativist researcher is interested to know what meaning 
the events which the research considered have for the participants involved.   What 
methods do they employ to manage and cope with them?   How do these meanings and 
methods contributes to what might be called the culture of the industry? 
So, for example, one might expect the interpretativist researcher to make the standard 
observations that on a project there is a division of labour and authority; many firms 
are involved; people come and go.   For site engineers or engineer-managers this is 
taken for granted as a necessary feature of their working life.   They may envisage 
alternatives; know of the talk that goes on about stabilising relationships, 'de-
fragmenting' the industry, the need for attitudes to change and 'get the culture right', 
but for the present they have to work out ways of living with it. 
One vexing problem is the very nature of their authority and the objectives it is used to 
achieve.   One of the many ambiguities they must juggle with, is that they are expected 
to apply their engineering knowledge and secure the economic objectives of their 
employer.   This is commonly experienced as having to trade off time, cost and quality 
objectives, since, given the tight profit margins the firm is working to, site staffing 
levels are reduced, the quality of labour is unpredictable and so on.    It is also 
experienced as having to administer formalised quality control or quality assurance 
systems which originate with people at head office whose motives for instituting them 
might be considered suspect.   Are they really to control quality, or are they to control 
site managers and thereby undermine their professional discretion and authority? 
Dilemmas of this sort may be thought of in terms two kinds of authority that they are 
expected to exercise and the ambiguities associated with each.   One source of 
authority is that they are members of an occupation, one amongst several that they 
have dealings with, and a special kind of occupation at that, a profession.   Because of 
their profession's historical association with the development of concrete as a material, 
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they have special responsibilities in its use.  To the extent that they are members of a 
professional association which controls entry through conditions of membership and, 
on that basis, seeks to guarantee competence, they carry certain legal responsibilities. 
In large part, the way concrete is supposed to be made and used is  provided in the 
pure, experimental sciences and they are expected to apply the codes and conventions 
that are derived from them.   But at the same time, they also know that some individual 
engineers are more competent than others;  some have greater experience than others 
and that, depending on such factors, engineers (themselves included), expect, to be 
allowed 'elbow room' to exercise their judgement.   Although concrete technology is 
derived from the exact sciences, using it on site in variable and unpredictable 
conditions, it is far from being exact. And, crucially, the work has to be carried out by 
a number of occupational specialisms over whom engineers are expected to exercise 
their professional authority by providing the criteria for judging the quality of work. 
This is complicated by the fact that the norm is now that these specialists are likely to 
employed by someone else.  
They may well find all this is difficult to explain to people who are not engineers.   On 
the one hand they have to preserve the view of themselves and their profession as 
dealing in hard demonstrable fact where unambiguous principles can be invoked, and, 
on the other, they do things because they ‘feel’ it is the right 'engineering' thing to do, 
taking into account all the other contractual and commercial considerations noted. 
One of the ways they shield themselves from this dilemma is to have learnt from other 
engineers a number of ritual practices.   They act, talk and dress like engineers. They 
conform to conventions, which go far beyond the technically necessary, to create 
confidence amongst the potential unbelievers and cynics who might be worried or 
critical if they were given reason to think that engineering practice is not all that it is 
supposed to be.   It is a common experience of  researchers to be asked to switch off 
the tape recorder with the words: "Now I'll tell you what we really do". 
In this, the engineer is no different from any other professional.   As Bagehot the 
C19th  constitutional historian pointed out, with regard to politicians, there is an 
efficient part of government and a dignified part.   All the pomp and ceremony is 
intended to sustain confidence that all is as it should be and that authority is being 
exercised effectively.    How far the particular rituals that we have inherited in this 
country still succeed in sustaining this confidence is questionable but the point remains, 
that however it is managed,  the professional in whom we necessarily vest our trust 
must work to maintain it.   One of the ways in which this is achieved is by not 
revealing what goes on 'behind the scene'
Gale (1990) has suggested ways in which overt and exaggeratedly 'macho' behaviour 
acts as a kind of bona fide, a  ritual demonstration of a person's membership of the 
construction community.   Thus, to act in a way consistent with standard expectations 
of what a particular occupational member should be like is a powerful cultural force. 
This is particularly important in those circumstances, typical of construction, where 
working relationships are often transitory.   Relationships between people who do not 
know each other can be made easier if people conform to type.   Typifications and 
stereotypes abound in construction because they facilitate transitory working 
relationships. 
However, they can also impede the development of longer-lasting more personalised 
relationships characteristic of effective working teams.   Thus, it is observed that 
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stereotyping is a negative feature of the existing culture.   The ambiguous nature of 
the engineer-managers' authority, referred to above, exacerbates this problem.   For, 
besides maintaining their professional authority, they must promote the interests of the 
firm that employs them.   Knowledge of this fact encourages people to attribute 
standard motives regardless of the dispositions of the actual  individuals involved.   So, 
in the abstract, 'everybody knows' that there are engineers who “think up smart 
solutions that don’t have a cat’s chance in hell of working,” or “Come up with 
impossible detailing because they don't know what it’s like on site.”   Equally,  from 
the other side of the contractual fence, there are those who are "always looking for 
reasons for claims and extras,” or  "cowboys who are always looking to pull a fast 
one.”
Certainly, efforts will be made to cultivate people 'on the other side'  who are disposed 
to act as fellow engineers;  collaborators in a common problem rather than as 
adversaries who 'make your life difficult just for the hell of it, or to "protect their own 
backs.”   Attempts will perhaps also be made by contractor’s engineers to try to 
develop good working relationships with subcontractors but, there may be uncertainty 
about their motives and rationales.   Contractor’s engineers, then, are just as likely to 
treat subcontractors with suspicion, be resentful of their interference, or be sceptical of 
their advice.   Yet developing these relationships and, over time perhaps, generating a 
new set of typifications, is precisely the substance of cultural change.
We have briefly indicated some of the concerns of an interpretative treatment of site 
engineers’ culture.   The approach may be equally applied to any occupation in the 
industry, such as steelfixers or formwork carpenters.   In these cases, engineers would 
appear as a feature in their lives, to be dealt with, given instructions by, negotiated 
with and so on.   The answers to research questions like, ‘why does this or that 
practice persist?’  are in terms of the conscious views and experiences of these people, 
as reported to, or observed by, the researcher.   We have very briefly indicated a 
number of such explanations from the study we considered earlier.   Head Office 
requires site engineers to carry out checking in a certain way, in the context of extreme 
commercial pressures, where the work is carried out by people over whom their 
authority is ambiguous.   They must also perform other important tasks which compete 
for their time.   They make a trade off, perhaps feeling deprived of the reassurance that 
checking provides.   These are  the facts that it is the researcher’s task to reveal, the 
very stuff of their attitudes and culture.   If such things are not taken into account, 
efforts to effect change will inevitably be misdirected.
8.  CONCLUSIONS
We have outlined the main assumptions and implications of the rationalist paradigm. 
The persuasiveness of this paradigm stems from the immense power of science to 
explain the natural world and provide means for changing it.   It is of little wonder, 
then, that many attempts have been made to apply scientific method to the 
understanding of human relations, in the hope of achieving similarly dramatic results. 
Engineers in particular, because their discipline draws heavily upon scientific methods 
and discoveries, are susceptible to the lure of this approach.   The kind of explanation 
which engineers are professionally inclined and qualified to supply is a technical one 
and their methodology arises from this technical orientation.  Among the community of 
researchers, however, it is not only engineers who have embraced the rationalist 
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paradigm.   In a society where the appelations ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ have such a 
high status, it is perhaps inevitable that members of almost every occupation have 
attempted to characterise their work as having a basis in science.   These attempts to 
enhance professional status might remain relatively harmless if they were not 
accompanied by the abuse of  scientific methods, in contexts for which they were not 
designed and in which they have no effective application.       
In our consideration of the study of structural features in section four and of the work 
of Deming in section six, we have attempted to outline some of the limitations of the 
rationalist paradigm.    The expectation implicit in the assumptions of this paradigm, is 
that research findings will be unambiguous.   This approach, though it produces data 
which looks as though it fulfils the rationalist requirement, is not suitable for making 
assessments of social processes.   We have introduced the reader to a small sample 
from the body of work which has criticised the rationalist paradigm and outlined an 
alternative approach.   This approach involves returning to fundamentals, to examining 
the methods by which knowledge of social processes can be gained, methods which all 
members of society use as an everyday matter of course.   The methods which 
researchers use can be essentially no different, though this does not excuse us from 
applying them as rigorously and self-consciously as possible.
The key to such an approach is that the researcher take seriously the worldviews of the 
people concerned.   This involves resisting the temptation to dismiss these views in 
favour of some ‘real’ version of the ‘facts,’ however self-evidently correct this version 
may appear.   This principle was stated many years ago by W. I. Thomas:  ‘If men 
define situations as real they are real in their consequences’ (Thomas1964).   The 
problem that we see with the rationalist paradigm is that it does not require researchers 
to question their own position.   Instead, rationalists put their faith in the use of 
particular methodological routines to guarantee their impartiality.   The researcher’s 
values are regarded as either irrelevant, or self-evidently correct.   In our view, this 
lack of self-consciousness results in methodologically unsound research and produces 
findings that are profoundly incomplete.   Any programme of action based on such 
findings is of questionable practical value.   We must, instead, ask genuinely empirical 
questions about what is going on in the situations we wish to understand,  particularly 
when considering those admired innovations we wish to learn from.   As we have tried 
to show, with reference to Ohno’s innovations, without an intimate knowledge of the 
situations which occur, we will be in no position to offer either diagnosis or remedy. 
We have attempted to demonstrate the kind of data this approach can generate, in our 
description of the situation of the site engineer.   This material is, to be sure, relatively 
unremarkable in itself and is mainly provided to illustrate a methodological point.   One 
significant fact which does emerge, however, is that practising engineers are faced with 
a disjunction between the world they live in and the idealised version of it provided by 
the rationalist paradigm.   In the everyday performance of their work, they recognise, 
research and resolve problems of human social process, with no recourse to rationalist 
prescriptions, or the need for ‘objective’ accounts.   This informal, unwritten and 
unsystemised knowledge should be a focus of research.     
A sub-theme to all of this is that practitioners and researchers participate in the same 
culture.   If our methods are the same, then so are our assumptions.   Thus, the 
relationship between production and research is a close and complex one.   The 
judgement of engineers, whether on a research panel, or in management, is accepted 
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because it consists of members of an occupation who, through their skills in the 
application of instrumental rationality, have played a central role in creating the 
technology and institutions of the construction industry.   There exists what Becker has 
called a ‘hierarchy of credibility’ in which certain kinds of information and certain 
kinds of informant carry more weight than others (Becker1970).   This is what we 
mean, when we say that the rationalist paradigm itself is a constituent part of the 
culture of the industry and why a change in the culture of research must be our first 
consideration. 
Engineers’ roles, their self-conception and modes of thinking have been specifically 
shaped by the nature of their involvement in the construction industry.   They have a 
viewpoint that might lead them, for example, either to distance themselves from the 
practicalities of construction or align their interests with the contractors.   Either way, 
to expect them to provide an ‘objective’ account of a process in which members of 
their profession are variously involved as active participants is problematic.    Their 
preferred procedures, diagnoses and remedies are inevitably selective and likely to be 
engendered by an engineering perspective.   
The question then arises:  how do research and practice relate?   Our answer is the one 
given by Max Weber many years ago:  they are crucially different.   The objectives of 
practitioners, for example, quality, efficiency, productivity or profits, cannot be taken 
to be self-evident by the researcher.   An essential purpose of research is to establish 
what participants in the situation under study, managers, engineers or steelfixers, mean 
by these terms and what values and beliefs underlie such meanings.   Researcher may 
well share some of the understandings of some of the participants, but it is imperative 
that they suspend their own understandings.   Only by doing so can they allow 
practitioners to speak for themselves. 
 
Some recognition of these facts has occurred in more recent applications of systems 
theory to human organisation.   Senge et al (1994), acknowledge the simplification 
that modelling entails, emphasising the need to recognise the purpose that the resultant 
'mental models' are intended to serve.   They are tools which are used by people in 
context with the wealth of tacit  meanings that those contexts have for the 
participants.   It is pointed out that the work of earlier ‘objective’ systems theorists, 
who had modelled natural or mechanical systems was misapplied to human systems. 
These Rationalist versions made the very dubious claim to offer objective versions of 
social reality. In similar vein to Senge, Checkland and Scholes (1990) suggest the term 
'holon' to mean a-version-of-the-system, emphasising the fact that any version of reality 
is provided by a situated person and will reflect that person’s values, beliefs and 
intentions.   It is vital, they argue, to recognise that the author of a holon has a 
particular world view.   Significantly, Senge begins his most recent book,  which 
concerns the applications of systems thinking, by extrapolating on the implications of 
an exchange of greetings characteristic of the tribespeople of  sub-Saharan  Africa.   It 
is, ‘I see you,’ with the response, ‘I am here.’   The point that he makes is that any 
form of social organisation begins from the fact of a self, which attributes meanings to 
events and seeks to share them with others (ibid).
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